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1. Introduction 
Dummett is not alone in highlighting the lack of engagement between metaphysics 
and science that has become so acute as to be detrimental to both disciplines.  Without 
such engagement, metaphysics is seen to be divorced from ‘the real world’ and as 
inhabiting a domain of fantasy ontologies, baroque possibilities or, at best, ‘toy 
models’.  Equally, bereft of metaphysical interpretation, modern physics is rendered 
positivistic, with its theories reduced to mere algorithms for the production of 
experimental results.  While there will always be those who do not see it to be the 
purpose of physics to extend beyond mere prediction and control, that metaphysicians 
are compliant with this situation is perplexing given that it is claimed that (a) “rock-
solid commitment to physicalism… is about as close to a bit of orthodoxy as one will 
find in contemporary philosophy,’’(Hall 2010)1 and that (b) it is the study of the 
fundamental that has been moving centre-stage within metaphysics in recent years 
(see Schaffer 2009). If all truths about the actual world are seen as determined by a 
fundamental physical basis, and it is the fundamental basis that is seen as the focus of 
metaphysical enquiry, the fact that so much metaphysics remains impervious to 
physics is bewildering to say the least.    
Our intention in this paper is not to offer much by way of explanation of this 
lack of engagement but instead to make a double-edged claim concerning it.  First of 
all, even if metaphysicians perpetuate this disengagement by developing theories that 
remain detached from modern physics, these theories may offer a set of resources that 
can be appropriated by philosophers of physics in order to set physics within an 
interpretational framework and may be valued for just that reason. Secondly, 
however, insofar as metaphysics is intended to be more than just a toolbox and to 
itself have some direct bearing on reality, the implications of physics need to be 
properly appreciated if many paradigmatically metaphysical claims are to stand up. In 
the absence of such appreciation, much of modern metaphysics remains ‘fantasy 
metaphysics’ even if, as we suggest, physically disinterested metaphysics in general 
may nonetheless offer resources that can be taken down off the shelf and put to work. 
 
2.  The Indispensibility of Metaphysics 
 
It is this failure of metaphysicians to regard the engagement with physics as an 
essential feature of their practice that has in part led to the recent anti-metaphysical 
turn within the philosophy of physics. Reflecting on his early development, Carnap 
wrote that “[m]ost of the controversies in traditional metaphysics appeared to me 
sterile and useless" (Carnap 1963, 44-45) and in the eyes of many philosophers of 
physics the current situation appears to present little by way of improvement. In a                                                         
1 According to physicalism, “The world is as physics says it is, and there's no more to say.” (Lewis 
1999, 33–34).   
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recent collection in which metaphysicians apply the tools of their trade to their own 
field, Price writes,  
 
Metaphysics is actually as dead as Carnap left it, but – blinded, in part, by 
[certain] misinterpretations of Quine – contemporary philosophy has lost the 
ability to see it for what it is, to distinguish it from live and substantial 
intellectual pursuits.’ (Price 2009, p. 323) 
Likewise, in the opening chapter of their defence of structural realism, Ladyman and 
Ross present an excoriating rejection of contemporary metaphysics, insisting that 
‘[m]ainstream analytic metaphysics has … become almost entirely  a priori’ 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007, 24). Even that which pays lip-service to naturalism by 
referring to quarks, their colours and flavours and other accoutrements of modern 
physics is dismissed as ‘really philosophy of A level chemistry’ (ibid.).  In their 
opinion, too many metaphysical positions are grounded in ‘intuition’ or reflection on 
‘everyday’ objects and their properties, and attempts to import these into the context 
of modern physics typically prove disastrous.  In consequence, according to Ladyman 
and Ross, analytic metaphysics ought to be ‘discontinued’(p. vii). 
 This growing anti-metaphysical literature is well known (and we will soon be 
adding some of our own pet frustrations to the list).  However, before we do so, we do 
feel that there is reason to draw back from sweeping claims to the effect that a priori 
metaphysics is without purpose or that it should be ‘discontinued’; whatever exactly 
the problem with contemporary metaphysics is taken to be, we would caution that the 
appropriate reaction to it by philosophers of science has to be considered carefully.  
Our reasons for this claim are based on the suggestion, mentioned above, that the 
products of analytic metaphysics can be regarded as available for plundering by 
philosophers of science in order that we might exploit them for our own purposes.  
And that such plundering is in fact regularly engaged in is no more evident than in the 
structuralist philosophy of science that we ourselves endorse: ontic structural realism, 
after all, invokes such notions as “modal structure”, ontological dependence, 
fundamentality and the metaphysics of relations, and hence has had to deploy a great 
deal of involved metaphysical theory in order to articulate its core claims.2 In our 
efforts to express the metaphysical revisions that physics forces upon us, we 
structuralists have found it immensely useful to call upon extant metaphysical 
packages on offer rather than have to develop the appropriate resources from scratch. 
The growing literature on ontological dependence, for example, is proving useful in 
expressing the core metaphysical claim of ontic structuralism, namely, that physical 
objects are ontologically secondary to structures (French, in preparation; McKenzie in 
preparation). A form of truthmaker theory might also be deployed in order to 
articulate the eliminativism about objects that ‘radical’ ontic structural realism 
endorses (French op. cit.). Even the work of Lewis – a philosopher who is often 
pilloried for his lack of engagement with science - has been summoned in defense 
against the triviality objection to structuralism, in the work of Melia and Saatsi 
(2006).3   
In various ways, then, structuralist philosophy of science has benefitted 
enormously from the existence of a body of metaphysics ready to take off the shelf                                                         
2 Standard – object oriented – realism may appear to avoid a similar deployment but only because it 
unreflectively incorporates the above intuitions and everyday reflections. 
3 Note that what is required of Lewis’ notion of ‘elite’ properties to block this objection is far less than 
is required for the ‘Best System’ analysis, to be discussed below. 
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when the moment arrived.  But since the afore-mentioned metaphysical packages 
were by and large developed independently of any consideration of contemporary 
physical theory, we would argue that it would be counterproductive to insist that the 
sort of analytic metaphysics that “floats entirely free of science” should be 
“discontinued”. Thus while we share many of the misgivings about metaphysics that 
Ladyman and Ross express, we believe that were this particular piece of advice to be 
heeded then genuinely naturalistic philosophy of science would undoubtedly suffer in 
consequence.  
In fact, the relationship between philosophy of science and metaphysics might 
be usefully compared to that between physics and pure mathematics. Just as it was 
useful to Einstein that the theory of non-Euclidean geometry was there for the taking 
when the moment arose, so it is useful to eliminative structuralists that there has been 
developed a theory of dependence compatible with the elimination of the dependent 
entity. And just as it was useful to the development of particle physics that the theory 
of Lie groups was largely completed by the time the appropriately high-energy 
regimes could be probed, so it is beneficial to the defender of the Everett 
interpretation that a theory of personal identity that makes decision-making make 
sense in branching universes was already on the market4.  And just as it was fortuitous 
that the theory of imaginary numbers was fit for use at the advent of the quantum 
revolution, so it has proved useful that various metaphysical packages were in place 
to provide possible frameworks for its interpretation, including haecceities and, more 
recently, a form of Leibniz’s Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, revamped a la 
Quine (French and Krause 2006; Saunders 2003). This is of course not to discourage 
the development of ‘made to order’ frameworks that engage (more or less) directly 
with the physics, such as the metaphysics of non-individuals and the associated 
formalism of quasi-set theory (French and Krause op. cit.); but nonetheless, given that 
scholastic or 17th century rationalist metaphysics can be usefully appropriated by the 
philosopher of quantum physics, it seems folly to try to predict in advance what will 
or will not prove useful to us in the course of time – a stance that should also be 
taken, of course, with regard to mathematical structures and entities (such as 
imaginary numbers) and their role in natural science. 
It is these sorts of historical considerations that suggest one reason we, as 
naturalistic philosophers, have to value scientifically disinterested metaphysics is that 
its constructions might prove to be useful in the philosophy of future science, 
regardless of how great the portions of metaphysics that turn out to be surplus to 
requirements.  And once that is conceded, it becomes very difficult to oppose 
scientifically disinterested metaphysics tout court. 
 
3. Why the disinterested nature of metaphysics? 
Nevertheless, whilst the above observations partially mitigate a physically 
disinterested approach to metaphysics – at least with respect to the ends and purposes 
of philosophy of physics – they don’t explain why metaphysicians habitually ignore a 
field that seems quite clearly central to their own discipline, nor does it entirely 
excuse it.  Metaphysicians, after all, presumably hold that there is value to their 
discipline beyond it serving as a production line for constructions that might                                                         
4 Of course, this is not to say that the relevant mathematics was developed entirely independently from 
the physical context (see Bueno and French forthcoming).  
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eventually be used and abused by philosophers of physics.  Furthermore, it seems that 
philosophers of physics can rightly hold that it is one thing for metaphysicians to 
come up with constructions that are entirely independent of contemporary physics – 
as with the above examples - and quite another for them to confect theories that both 
claim to employ physical entities and willfully ignore or misrepresent the relevant 
physics when it suits their purposes to do so.5  So why is metaphysics so decoupled 
from physics?  
A plausible answer would probably cite the fact that philosophy has 
increasingly grown to conceive of itself as ‘the science of the possible’.6  Callender 
(2011) nicely charts the recent developments that have led to the widespread embrace 
of this conception, beginning with the work of Kripke that made modality respectable 
again and tracing it through to its present state - a state in which many metaphysicians 
would agree that,  
‘… whereas scientists excavate dusty field sites and mix potions in 
laboratories to tell us which states of affairs are actual, metaphysicians are 
concerned with what is and isn’t metaphysically possible.’ (Callender 2011, 
36) 
This contemporary perspective on the scope and purpose of metaphysics is reflected 
in Lowe when he states that ``[e]mpirical science at most tells us what is the case, not 
what must or may be… Metaphysics deals in possibilities,’’ and similar sentiments 
pepper the contemporary literature (Lowe 1998, 11).  
The consequences of this evolution in metaphysicians’ concept of their 
discipline for the role of physics within it are twofold.  First of all, since it is primarily 
conceivability that is taken to map out possibility space, the ontology of physics is 
dwarfed by the remaining merely possible ontology that metaphysics has a duty to 
study.7  Secondly, since on this conception it is the question of the possibilities 
available to this ontology that constitutes the central question of metaphysical interest 
concerning it, and these possibilities are again primarily staked out in terms of 
conceivability, it follows that even with regard to the subset of physical ontology, 
physics cannot suffice to settle the important metaphysical questions. Thus the 
relevance of physics is twice diminished: once because it fails to furnish metaphysics 
with anything but a tiny slice of the objects and properties falling within its proper 
domain of study, and again because it cannot adequately address the important 
metaphysical questions about even that thin slice.   
The feeling that physics has at best peripheral significance is made explicit in 
Conee and Sider when they write 
 
Metaphysics is about the most explanatory basic necessities and possibilities.  
Metaphysics is about what could be and what must be.  Except incidentally, 
metaphysics is not about explanatorily ultimate aspects of reality that are 
actual… (Conee and Sider 2005, 203; latter italics ours)                                                         
5 Indeed, in our opinion, it is that the latter ‘lip-service’ is so often practiced that constitutes the truly 
alarming take-home message of Ladyman and Ross’ book; a list of examples can be found on p18. 
6 For an early statement of this conception see Russell (1919). 
7 As Yablo puts it, “If there is a serious alternative basis [to conceivability] for possibility theses, 
philosophers have not discovered it.” (Yablo, 1993).  
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Here we will not take issue with the idea that possibility is a (perhaps the) central 
question in metaphysics, nor with the idea that it is an emphasis on the possible that is 
in some sense distinctive of metaphysical enquiry.  What we do wish to dispute, 
however, is the idea that physics has only an ‘incidental’ or marginalized role within 
metaphysics even if we buy into this conception of metaphysics (cf. Callender op. cit., 
pp. 43-44). Although philosophy is replete with examples of how the history of 
science has expanded our conceptions of the possible, we will here emphasize how 
science circumscribes it and moreover does so in a way that reinstates physics as the 
proper point of departure for modal questions concerning the actual.  Granted that this 
issue too has received some attention (see, again, Callender op. cit.), we will try to 
flesh out some of the details by emphasizing just how fruitless modal discussions 
concerning physical ontology are if taken to be divorced from actual physics.8  In 
doing so, we hope to show that the idea that the emphasis on the modal entails that the 
philosophy of physics does not have a central (expository and regulatory) role to play 
within the discipline as a whole is entirely misguided. 
We will frame our discussion around what is perhaps the most basic question 
in modal metaphysics, namely that of whether modality is ontologically primitive or 
rather such that modal claims may be expressed without remainder in terms of the 
inherently non-modal. Our approach to this question will focus on the arguments 
surrounding the modal status of laws of nature – that is, surrounding nomological 
necessity - and the issue of whether something primitively modal is needed in 
addition to the `non-nomic base’ in order to account for natural laws. 
 
4. Laws, Modality and the Non-Nomic Base 
Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches to the theorizing about the modality 
attached to laws: (i) reductive accounts, in which the laws are taken to supervene on a 
`basis of non-nomic facts’ - that is, on a basis of states of affairs constituted wholly by 
categorical properties and relations, and (ii) non-reductive accounts, in which the laws 
are regarded as an ‘additional ingredient’ in the inventory of a world.  Thus while 
each account postulates worlds, that laws hold in these worlds, and a categorical or 
non-nomic basis to each, they differ over whether the laws constitute additional items 
in the inventory of the worlds over and above their categorical bases.  Let us take 
Lewis as the leading representative of the first position (see Sider 2003), Lange as our 
proponent of the second, and begin with a discussion of the latter.  
 
4a. Anti-Reductionist Accounts of Nomological Necessity 
 
Lange’s sophisticated and subtle account of laws is markedly different from the 
nomic necessitation account of Dretske, Tooley and Armstrong (DTA) but bears 
similarity to it in its commitment to primitive modality.9 For Lange, as for them, the 
laws are independent of and ontologically additional to the categorical basis – in 
Lange’s words, they are like “powdered sugar sprinkled over the doughy surface of                                                         
8 And of course, if modal debates concerning actual fundamental ontology are fruitless when detached 
from physics, their fruitfulness when they concern putative ontology we are not epistemically 
acquainted with in even the indirect sense that we are with physics can only be subject to further doubt. 
9 Here we are primarily taking Lange (2009) as representative of his view. 
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the non-nomic facts.” (Lange 2000, 51). Lange argues for the non-reductive aspect of 
his view by motivating the idea that a world with a lone proton could be governed by 
a number of different laws.  Hence the reductive ‘Humean supervenience’ account, 
according to which laws are determined by the non-nomic basis, must be false.10   
Arguments for a similar conclusion have been mounted by defenders of the DTA 
analysis, perhaps most notably Carroll (1994). Carroll presents us with two worlds, 
identical with respect to all particular matters of fact and hence containing the same 
regularities but which are stipulated to have different laws. However, as Beebee has 
pointed out, the very plausibility of the stipulated scenarios assumes a ‘governing’ 
conception of laws that defenders of the reductive account reject from the outset 
(Beebee 2000). Thus, it is claimed, this and similar arguments simply beg the 
question as a result.  
Lange, however, attempts to avert this objection by doing more than simply 
appeal to the intuition that it is possible for the laws to differ in two worlds with the 
same non-nomic basis: he goes further by motivating that thought by appealing to the 
more neutral intuition that many facts about the world could have been different 
without the laws being so (Lange 2000). The key idea is that laws can be 
distinguished from accidents in virtue of possessing ‘counterfactual stability’, where 
this is to be understood in terms of the lawlike generalisations remaining true under 
logically independent counterfactual circumstances that are accidental. Taking those 
propositions that do not contain the phrase ‘it is a law that’ or any modal operator to 
be ‘sub-nomic’, the set of such sub-nomic propositions can be defined as stable if the 
members of the set remain true under every sub-nomic supposition consistent with the 
set.  A generalisation is then regarded as lawful if and only if it belongs to the largest 
non-maximal stable set of true propositions; thus, ‘…necessity involves a kind of 
maximal persistence under counterfactual suppositions.’ (Lange 2007, 472) 
His intuition that the laws remain fixed under ‘counterfactual perturbations’ is 
a plausible one to which the Humean will be sympathetic - at least to some degree.  
By following this intuition through to (what he takes to be) its natural conclusion, 
Lange motivates the claim that the laws of this, the actual world would remain the 
laws of a world in which there is nothing but a lone proton.  Since it is held that one 
can imagine another world where protons obey very different laws than ours do, and 
given that from that world one could arrive at a lone proton world holding those laws 
invariant just as we obtained a categorically similar world while holding our laws 
invariant, we see that two worlds that contain the same non-nomic facts can differ 
with regard to their laws.  It is this invariance of laws across such radical changes of 
non-nomic facts that leads Lange to conclude that the laws cannot be constrained by 
these facts in the way the reductive account maintains. 
Lange’s argument thus represents a distinctive and novel twist on arguments 
in defence of irreducible modality.  Lonely worlds are in fact a staple of nomological 
arguments issuing from both ends of the spectrum, presumably since they provide a 
simple setting in which questions about the relationship of categorical bases to the 
nomic superstructure in question can be systematically addressed (cf Haufe and Slater 
2009, 266). It may easily be seen, however, that the method through which these 
‘lonely’ possible worlds are generated is actually crucial to the success of Lange’s 
argument.  Reflection on this both offers a way out for the proponent of the reductive 
account and - more relevantly for our purposes - is indicative of the concerns that                                                         
10 Here and throughout we understand Lewis’ ‘Humean supervenience’ account to be stripped of its 
problematic locality assumptions (which are irrelevant for our purposes). 
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arise when metaphysics is allowed to float free from physics.  Let us go through how 
this works. 
Two modes of lonely-world generation can be discerned in metaphysical 
discussions (the following is taken from Haufe and Slater 2009): ‘impoverishment’ 
and ‘building from scratch’.  In the case of the former, we start with ‘our’ world and 
then depopulate it over time to arrive at (say) the lone proton world.  In the case of the 
latter, by contrast, we ‘build from the ground up’, as it were, a permanently sparse 
world containing only one proton (Haufe and Slater ibid., 269-270).  This latter is a 
world in which ‘all God had to do’ was create a single proton in order to create the 
non-nomic basis of this world. 
Lange himself adopts the impoverishment strategy (op. cit., 87) and on the 
basis of the intuition that the laws would remain as they are even through radical non-
nomic changes he concludes that this would hold even when such changes include 
severe depopulation.  Likewise, if we were to start with other worlds where the laws 
are different we could impoverish these to arrive at a one-proton world.  As 
mentioned above, the claim is then that since the same apparent regularity – one 
proton scooting about – can support very different laws, the reductive account is 
gravely undermined.  However, there are clearly concerns one should have about the 
soundness of this argument.   
First of all, it is not at all straightforward to claim that merely by obtaining a 
given lonely world via impoverishment from very different ‘starting’ worlds one has 
thereby obtained a world with the same regularity in each case (a claim clearly crucial 
for the above conclusion to go through).  For if the regularity in play here includes the 
relevant history of the lone proton, say, then it will not in general be the case that the 
same regularity is obtained.  And since ‘impoverishment’ is explicitly understood as 
leaving the history of the world intact up to some point, the lone-proton world 
obtained from this world can be said to be very different from the lone-proton world 
generated from the world with very different laws since the two ‘starting’ worlds have 
different histories (Haufe and Slater op. cit., 269). It therefore follows that the two 
lone-proton worlds will contain very different regularities and hence we do not have a 
case of ‘same regularities, different laws’ that would undermine the reductive 
account.   
Furthermore, and quite apart from the failure of the impoverishment strategy 
to generate worlds with different laws but identical regularities, one should have 
serious doubts about the crucial intuition that the laws remain invariant under 
successive impoverishments of the categorical base.  That the laws remain stable 
under removal of (at least some) ‘everyday’ objects seems uncontentious: it seems 
hard to find any grounds at all for claiming that in a world like ours in all respects 
except that it is missing the Eiffel tower, Newton’s laws would not have held (ibid., 
270-271).  But one does not have to move beyond the everyday to stretch the 
intuition: what about a world in which everything but the Eiffel tower has been 
removed? What history consistent with the relevant laws could produce such an 
outcome?  Likewise – and turning now to the objects of the microworld - is it possible 
for the laws of the Standard Model to produce a solution in which there is just one 
proton?  It should be obvious that even if this question receives a positive answer 
(which to us appears unlikely), it is a non-trivial matter to establish that it does.11  At                                                         
11 Lange himself on the other hand seems very confident about this: he writes (Lange 2000, 85) that 
‘When we contemplate the closest lone-proton world… we imagine taking the actual world and setting 
its initial conditions so that a lone proton is the result generated by the actual laws.  Cosmologists 
might run their computer simulation for these rather boring initial conditions – perhaps as a test of their 
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such extremes our intuitions seem stretched to breaking point and it is certainly no 
longer the case that one can just blithely maintain that the laws would remain the 
same as they were following such depletions. 
In any case, given that ‘contamination’ from histories annuls the ambitions of 
the impoverishment strategy, if Lange is to create situations in which he can claim 
that there is a single regularity and yet a variety of possible laws it must be via 
‘building from scratch’.  Yet things are no better if one generates such worlds by this 
second strategy (Haufe and Slater ibid., 269-270).  In this case the regularities are 
unambiguous since the history of the world that depopulation starts from is not 
problematically carried over into the world under consideration (since there is no 
depopulation), but by relinquishing depopulation methods we lose whatever grounds 
– however thin – that we may have had previously for maintaining the intuition that 
the laws will remain invariant.  Some other means of ascertaining the laws that hold 
in a ‘built from scratch’ world must be found; but while the regularities in such a 
world may be regarded as settled (or at least as settled as the stipulated categorical 
base), it seems to us that we simply have no idea of what the laws appropriate to this 
world are if they are taken to transcend the regularities.   
For consider yet again the lone proton world.  The only theory we know of 
that (we think) correctly describes the proton is the Standard Model of particle 
physics; but that the Standard Model’s laws could apply in this world is (to say the 
least) far from clear.  Think of the questions that a physicist would have to address in 
an attempt to ascertain whether this was indeed the case.  Could the lone-world proton 
– defined by a certain set of determinate fundamental properties – have (all the) mass 
that it is actually taken to have, in the absence of the Higgs?  Could the proton be 
properly said to be charged in the absence of photons that mediate the electromagnetic 
interaction?12  Could the symmetries of the actual laws – say matter - anti-matter 
symmetry – be said to hold in a world permanently devoid of antimatter?  Similarly, 
given that actual protons are related to other types of hadrons via global SU(3) 
symmetry, could this symmetry be said to hold in a world in which there are no 
tokens of these other hadron types?13  And is it possible for a world to contain just a 
single quantum particle throughout its entire history given that quantum mechanics 
gives a finite probability for all particles to decay to a particle of another type 
(although here the proton is perhaps a special case)?  It can quickly be seen that layer 
upon layer of questions – questions with non-trivial answers - must be addressed if we 
are to progress with this issue.  We once again see that although the assumed 
categorical basis is certainly ‘simple’, the defense of the claim that that basis 
represents a solution of actual laws is certainly not; and furthermore, if the defense of 
the claim that the lone-proton world represents a solution of the actual laws is highly 
non-trivial (if indeed it can be defended at all), what hope have we of defending the 
idea that it is a solution of realistic natural laws – i.e. laws of similar complexity to 
those of actual physics – when we don’t even have any idea what those laws are 
supposed to look like?                                                           
program’. It is not clear that this corresponds to anything cosmologists would, or indeed, could, do. In 
particular, if the laws are related to the relevant symmetries, as they must be if they are to be deemed 
‘actual’, then there are deep problems; technical obstacles may further impede the generation of such 
lonely scenarios. (We’d like to thank Erik Curiel for providing further details on these obstacles.) 
12 This point will be returned to below. 
13 There are obvious paradigmatically metaphysical worries here too: if, for example, one were to adopt 
an Armstrongian view of properties (in which they must be instantiated in any given world to be 
nomically related in that world), the possibilities described here would be ruled out.    
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The claim that there are a variety of laws that could hold in such a world now 
appears very hasty indeed: it is not clear that we can establish that even the actual 
laws hold in a world containing this basis, let alone a variety of laws unbeknownst to 
us.  The proponent of reductionism, on the other hand, can of course turn all this to 
their advantage: they will simply insist that the laws of lonely worlds generated this 
way correspond to whatever the regularities in such worlds are and – unlike any 
alleged laws that go beyond these regularities - these may be regarded as 
unambiguous.  At the very least, the burden of argument has most certainly shifted 
away from her (ibid., 270).  
 We thus see that if the simple worlds these anti-reductionist arguments trade 
in are generated via impoverishment, the actual laws continue to infect the world in a 
way that undermines the argument against the reductive account.  If, on the other 
hand, we try to build such a world from scratch, it seems at worst implausible and at 
best highly non-trivial that the actual laws could be said to hold in a lone-proton 
world devoid of the electrons, anti-protons, gauge bosons, etc., to which actual 
protons are nomologically connected - let alone whether some as yet unspecified laws 
do.  Moreover, given that our only theory of the proton is one in which it is governed 
by actual laws, and given that - as Haufe and Slater point out - our intuitions about 
what would happen in lone proton worlds must remain `radically unclear’ (ibid. p. 
270), there does not appear to be any resources whatsoever available with which to 
settle this issue.  As such, it appears that there is simply nothing we can bring to the 
table with regard to defending Lange. 
 
4b. Reductionist Accounts of Nomological Necessity 
 
As we have just seen, the failure of the anti-reductionist to mount a challenge against 
the regularity theorist consists largely in the lack of resources with which they might 
defend the idea that a variety of laws can pertain to a given non-nomic basis.  Since 
the reductionist does not posit anything over and above that determined by the basis 
and that basis is regarded as unambiguously specified, futile trips to other worlds do 
not appear to be required for them to settle questions about what laws correspond to 
given basis – something that should by now be clear is a definite advantage.  Popular 
consensus has it that Lewis’ ‘sophisticated regularity account’ is the most promising 
representative of the reductionist views and it is this that we will take as our example 
of the Humean end of the spectrum (Lewis 1983). On this account, only those 
regularities that are theorems of the best systematization of the non-nomic basis 
deserve the title of laws.  The ‘best system’ in turn is understood as the 
axiomatization of the basis that achieves the best balance of simplicity and strength.  
Thus, laws conform to (what we might call) the familiar ‘regularities plus’ picture but 
here the extra factor does not involve any primitive modality: the laws that hold in a 
world remain fully determined by the basis, though in a more involved fashion than 
would be the case in a cruder account. 
As already noted, since the best system is held to be determined by features 
intrinsic to the categorical basis it looks as though, in contrast to the previous account, 
the laws associated with a given basis can be established without recourse to trips to 
other possible worlds.  However – when the best system is understood a la Lewis at 
least - this independence from other-worldly considerations in fact turns out to be 
spurious, for it transpires that we do have to consider the other-worldly behaviour of 
actual kinds to specify the best system for any given basis.  This is because – as Lewis 
acknowledges – the ‘simplicity’ requirement on the best system is vacuous unless 
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supplemented with the requirement that the axiomatization be performed in a 
specified language (Lewis ibid., 367). As is well known, and in keeping with his 
metaphysical framework as a whole, Lewis takes this language to be that whose 
predicates pick out the perfectly natural properties.  These perfectly natural properties 
are then taken to coincide with the fundamental properties (since it is ultimately these 
that suffice to specify worlds).  
It is indisputably essential to Lewis’ reductive ambitions in general that all the 
perfectly natural properties are intrinsic, for otherwise they cannot be subject to the 
‘principle of free recombination’ that lies at the heart of his modal system.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of the predicate of ‘perfectly natural’ as an ideological 
primitive is motivated by the theoretical benefits of doing so; since it is the suitability 
of these properties to analyze duplication that grounds the majority of these benefits, 
and since their ability to analyze duplication requires that they be intrinsic, unless 
these properties are intrinsic then the motivation for including this primitive is 
seriously undercut.  Now, for Lewis (as for others) a property is intrinsic only if it 
could be had by a lone object (which of course is to say in the Lewisian framework 
that there is a world in which a lone object has it; cf. Langton and Lewis 1998). 
Furthermore, it is clear that the only ‘perfectly natural’ and hence fundamental 
properties that we – as this-worldly agents – may be said to have any epistemic 
acquaintance with are, by physicalism, the properties of fundamental physics. These 
Lewis lists as “the charges and masses of particles, also their so-called ‘spins’ and 
‘colours’ and ‘flavours’, and maybe a few more that have yet to be discovered.” 
(1986, 60). Hence if we want to verify the crucial claim that all the perfectly natural 
properties are intrinsic - as all Lewisians surely should – then all we can reasonably 
hope to do is to check that these properties are intrinsic.  But how are we to do this?
  
There seem to be just two places (to our knowledge) where Lewis considers 
the issue.  In one, he writes that “On my analysis, all of the perfectly natural 
properties come out as intrinsic.  That seems right.” (1983, 16). In the other, he asserts 
that “It can plausibly be said that all the perfectly natural properties are intrinsic.” 
(1986, 61). Unfortunately for Lewisians, however, it is not at all obvious that these 
properties are intrinsic: there are in fact good reasons to say that they are either 
simply not intrinsic or at best such that their intrinsicality must remain forever 
unbeknownst to us.   
The most expedient argument that one can marshal against the claim that all 
the fundamental physics properties are intrinsic is perhaps that which exploits the fact 
that the (current best candidates for) the fundamental laws of physics are formulated 
as local gauge theories. The basic idea underpinning such theories is that the 
equations governing particle interactions should be generated from the interaction-
free equations by demanding that those equations are invariant under a local gauge (or 
‘local phase’) transformation.  Thus, in order to generate the properties of particles 
through which they undergo fundamental interactions (such as the colours of quarks 
and the charges of electrons), one must apply the appropriate gauge transformation to 
their interaction-free equation (in both cases the Dirac Lagrangian, which describes 
the free motion of spin-1/2 particles).  This is in fact now viewed as the fundamental 
guiding principle of particle physics (though the underlying reason for this is a matter 
of dispute). But the essential point for our purposes is that these local gauge 
transformations applied to the free-particle equations imply the existence of at least 
one new particle, since the implementation of the procedure inevitably introduces 
what is called a gauge boson. In the case of electrodynamics, for example, this 
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particle is the photon; in the case of the strong interaction we introduce the gluons, 
and similarly in the case of the weak interaction we obtain the W and Z bosons.  Thus 
if we understand the properties through which the fundamental constituents of matter 
interact in terms of gauge transformations, and these bring in their wake the 
appropriate gauge bosons, then it looks as if we have no choice but to say that the 
properties such as charge and colour are not the sort of properties that lone objects can 
have, and hence that these properties are not after all intrinsic.  
If this conclusion is correct, it represents a very bad result for Lewisians.  In 
light of it, we can envisage Lewisians defending themselves by means of one of the 
following two strategies.  The first strategy is to accept that these properties are 
indeed extrinsic but to take this as a signal that they are not after all fundamental; 
rather, what is fundamental is a previously unacknowledged external relation. 14 The 
claim is thus that we should reconceive of charge, colour and other properties 
involved with gauge transformations in terms of relations that do not supervene on 
properties of their relata (presumably in this case principally fermions and gauge 
bosons).  The details of this would certainly have to be worked out, though there are 
at least two worries that we have about this general approach.  First of all, such a 
strategy sits uncomfortably with the supposedly ‘physicalistic’ claim of Lewis that it 
is up to physics to provide an inventory of the this-worldly fundamental properties 
and relations, given that physicists apparently do count these properties as 
fundamental and do not appear to ever make reference to the alleged external relation 
– whatever it is - that is (hypothetically) being appealed to here.  And secondly, even 
if such an external relation can be cooked up, we do not see how any such relation 
could hope to be specified without making reference to gauge symmetry; since this 
symmetry is a feature of laws, presumably no such relation could be taken as a 
denizen of the ‘non-nomic base’ Lewisians take to determine laws.   
A more plausible strategy would be that of holding that even though as far as 
actual physics is concerned these properties are conceptually entwined with the 
implementation of local gauge transformations, and even though these 
transformations bring in their wake the corresponding gauge bosons, these bosons are 
nevertheless only contingently associated with these properties.  This would of course 
amount to a denial of a certain form of nomological essentialism that would need to 
be argued for in the specific case at hand, though we should note that Lewis’ general 
argument against nomological essentialism rests upon the principle of recombination - 
a principle whose validity turns on precisely that which is currently in question (see 
Lewis 1986, 162-3).  
In any case, if the gauge-theoretic argument against intrinsicality is sound, 
then if Lewisians want to maintain that charge is nevertheless intrinsic they must 
establish that there is a possible world in which the laws are consistent with a lone 
charged particle – a lone proton, say.  By the above argument, such a world of course 
cannot be a world in which the actual laws hold.  In having to ascertain whether such 
a world is possible, we therefore find ourselves once again having to contemplate 
lone-proton worlds wholly bereft of the resources with which to analyze them, 
namely, the theories of protons and of electric charge that physicists have 
painstakingly constructed and provided us with.  Without anything with which we can 
meaningfully establish that lone objects can have these properties, then, if we want to 
continue to claim that all the perfectly natural properties are intrinsic then we must                                                         
14 See Darby (2009) for an example of extending the inventory of external relations as a Lewisian 
response to quantum physics. 
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either simply stipulate it or remain agnostic on the issue.  But either way this is a bad 
result. Not only is intrinsicality required for their free recombination, the inclusion of 
perfectly natural properties within Lewis’ system is motivated principally by their 
theoretical fecundity and, as mentioned above, that fecundity is overwhelmingly 
dependent on their intrinsicality.  Hence without any good reason to believe any 
longer that all the fundamental properties are intrinsic, we should be hesitant about 
continuing to appeal to them at all.  And that is no less the case when it comes to 
appealing to them to solve the ‘simplicity’ problem that - if left unchecked - ruins the 
best system analysis. 
Now, we are of course not pretending to have done a full survey of all the 
Humean analyses one could deploy in this situation, nor of all the possible get-out 
clauses that defenders of the one account we did look at might exploit.  But we do 
hope to have shown that there is a significant lacuna in this most familiar of modal 
analyses from a naturalistic point of view. A defence of Lewis’ analysis, as with the 
rival anti-reductionist account, inevitably requires us to consider actual fundamental 
properties in worlds in which the actual laws of physics do not hold.  But once again, 
since everything that we know about these properties is tied to our theories and hence 
to the laws that actually hold, we find in each case that there is simply nothing useful 
that we can say in such scenarios.   
4c.  Moving on from mere assertion 
That there is nowhere for the kind of reasoning engaged in above to go is something 
that we feel we all must ultimately accept.  Extracting ourselves from the debate 
between supporters and critics of the various modal accounts of laws, the lesson we 
can draw with regard to the theme of this essay is that these methods of imaginary 
world-building utilizing the properties of fundamental physics are deeply problematic 
and hence the modal theories that depend on them equally so.  In a sense this 
reaffirms Hacking’s admonishment to possible world builders that ‘mere assertion’ 
about such worlds is not enough - not enough in that case to eliminate Leibniz’s 
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles as necessary on the basis of the ‘mere assertion’ 
of Blackian ‘two globe’ worlds, but more generally, not enough to illuminate features 
of relevance to this world (Hacking 1975). Our inability to say anything with content 
about physical properties and entities without a working physical theory shows us 
that, so long as metaphysicians are concerned with the fundamental and inhabit the 
actual world, to think that physics is assigned a peripheral role in metaphysics on the 
grounds that it primarily concerns the modal is to fancy ourselves as having cognitive 
powers that we simply do not have. This simple epistemic point clearly places tight 
constraints on the kind of modal theorizing that we can and hence should indulge in.  
Of course, it might be objected that one can still meaningfully engage in modal talk 
outwith such constraints but we regard such talk as fantastical in the sense that what is 
involved is fantasy modality – or to appropriate Leibniz’s term, ‘chimerical’ – built 
merely on alleged ‘conceivability’ and not ‘genuine’ possibilities in the sense of being 
grounded in anything that resembles science. Although, as noted earlier, empirically 
detached metaphysics may yield resources that the philosopher of science can 
appropriate in interpreting physics, any such appropriation will in turn be sensitive to 
that physics; metaphysical constructions purporting to involve physical particles and 
properties ripped out of the theories through which we know them are unlikely to 
illuminate much – either about physics or anything else. 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5. Towards a Structuralist Account of Laws and Modality 
If we adhere to the view that metaphysics is primarily about the modal, the above 
considerations may be felt to lead to a rather demoralizing conclusion, namely, that 
there is little for metaphysics to do beyond redescribing science. But rather than 
simply sitting around helpless in the face of the difficulties outlined above we 
suggest that we try to adopt a more positive stance. In our view, the reason for the 
impasse that has been reached in both the reductionist and anti-reductionist cases is 
precisely the shared presupposition: that there is such a thing as a non-nomic base.15  
We have seen that it makes no sense from a naturalistic point of view to consider the 
objects and properties in isolation from the theories in which they are introduced, so 
what is the purpose of regarding the objects and properties in this base as ‘non-
nomic’?  Any defense of this idea would doubtlessly take us back to considering the 
sort of artificial worlds that we already have, and once again to no effect. 
We therefore suggest that we cease to view even the ‘base’ of a world as non-
nomic and instead understand fundamental objects and their properties in terms of the 
structuralist tradition in philosophy of physics (cf. Black 2000). According to this 
view, objects and their properties are ‘law constituted’ in various ways.  In the context 
of classical physics, Newton’s laws plus the Law of Universal Gravitation may be 
taken to yield the relevant kind-properties, so that the kinds that a theory as a whole 
concerns are encoded within the shared structure of the models of the theory (Brading 
2011). With respect to physics post the quantum revolution, structuralists have 
pressed that since it has been characteristic of the practice of twentieth century 
physics to conceptualize fundamental particles in terms of the Lie groups encoding 
the symmetries of the laws those particles partake in, naturalism enjoins us to unravel 
the natures of those particles in these terms as well.  Maintaining maximal continuity 
with physics and identifying particles in terms of the symmetries of laws means that 
fundamental particles can no longer be considered to constitute a non-nomic base.16  
As such, the fundamental presupposition of both the above approaches disappears, 
and with it the above impasses.   
Conceiving of particles in this way is not, however, ipso facto to imply that 
there are no interesting modal questions one can ask about the laws such particles 
satisfy and, in particular, whether they can satisfy laws different from those they do.  
Identifying particles in terms of symmetries does not interfere with the relative 
coupling strengths of the various interactions, for example, so that one can still 
enquire into counterlegals such as what the actual world with its inventory of particles 
would be like if, say, the relative strength of the electromagnetic force was ten times 
stronger at a distance of a femtometer (so that the electromagnetic repulsion between 
protons is beginning to impinge on their strong nuclear attraction, threatening the 
cohesion of matter; cf. Lange 2002, 78). Similarly, one can make sense of the 
questions physicists ask of what the world would be like if there was no Higgs 
mechanism (cf. Quigg 2007, section 5). Speaking more generally, the question of the 
extent to which the laws that particles feature in are uniquely determined once we 
identify those particles in terms of nomic symmetries evolves into the question of the 
extent to which symmetry structure determines the laws uniquely – something that it                                                         
15 Indeed, we would argue that the usual understandings of ‘categorical’ properties are adapted to a 
wholly classical (i.e. ‘functional) account of law; as far as we can tell, not one of the usual ways of 
characterizing categorical properties applies to fundamental kind properties once interactions are 
understood in terms of the operator equations through which quantum laws are expressed.  
16 See (for example) Cei and French [forthcoming]; Castellani (1998); Livanios (2010). 
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in general does not, although this claim is sometimes made for local gauge 
symmetries.  Questions concerning nomological essentialism consequently turn on the 
status of the gauge principle in fundamental physics and the status of frequent claims 
to the effect that this principle ‘dictates’ the dynamics.17  All things considered, then, 
the sorts of questions that Lange et al. raise for whether particles of a given type can 
satisfy alternative laws may therefore still arise when we identify particles in terms of 
(this aspect of) nomic structure; the difference in this case is that what is required to 
meaningfully answer these questions is better defined and – most gratifyingly of all - 
the task of actually doing so blends continuously into tasks that occupy that area of 
enquiry most revered by the majority of contemporary philosophers: that is, 
fundamental physics.   
In conclusion, if metaphysicians want to be more than purveyors of fancy 
goods for philosophers of science to appropriate, and even if metaphysics regards 
itself as the study of the possible, given the central methodological role of the actual 
in systematic modal theorizing and physics’ privileged role within it, metaphysicians 
cannot but engage with the philosophy of physics.  We hope to have shown that a 
structuralist account of that physics opens up more fruitful avenues of metaphysical 
discussion than those predicated on a myth of a `non-nomic base’ that knows no place 
in science.  
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